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Thank you Professor Anderson, and thank you to Transactions: The
Tennessee Journal of Business Law and the University of Tennessee College of
Law for the opportunity to address this symposium and respond to
Professor Anderson today.1
Professor Anderson has eloquently and ably stated why socialmedia-driven (SMD) trading, at least in the form as we have seen in recent
trading with respect to the stock of GameStop Corp. and AMC
Entertainment Holdings, Inc., is likely not in contravention of U.S.
securities laws or regulations issued under and case law opining on Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.2 I could not purport to perform a
more thorough analysis or enumerate the statutory and regulatory
standards with respect to insider trading laws Professor Anderson has
already set forth. However, I wish to step back and view the forest for the
trees and ask a simple question–what is the purpose of federal securities
regulation?
The legislative philosophy underlying the Securities Exchange Act
is that “[t]here cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon
mystery and secrecy.”3 In addition to this call for transparency, our federal
securities laws rest on older common law concepts, such as an agent's
fiduciary duty to a principal as incorporated into the common law of
corporations and contractual concepts, such as fraud in the inducement.
But SMD trading has led to a broader question: what if market
manipulation does not run afoul of either the principle of transparency or
common law concepts of fiduciary duty and fraud?
Should market manipulation, and by manipulation in this case we
mean trading to induce price fluctuations which have no relation to either
the underlying fundamentals of a company’s performance or quantitative
analysis of a stock’s pricing, be unlawful, regardless of such manipulation’s
relation to the transparency of information regarding an issuer or any
actor’s common law obligations? I cannot disagree with Professor
Anderson’s analysis of the lawfulness of SMD trading under existing
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securities laws and regulations, but I would encourage Congress to
evaluate the purpose of federal securities law.
If we are to take a libertarian view of securities law and require
only that willing buyers and willing sellers be provided with all information
necessary for a prudent investor to make an investment decision, then it
is difficult to say that current federal securities law is insufficient. If,
however, the purpose of federal securities law is more paternalistic and is
to create efficient markets that reflect the true underlying value of any
particular security, as such value analysis is limited by the frailty of human
analysis and the limitations of information relating to the future
performance of any particular issuer, then the current federal securities
laws demonstrate themselves to fall woefully short, as is demonstrated by
recent well-publicized SMD trading. Another issue in implementing this
more paternalistic form of securities regulation is if and how such form of
securities regulation could be implemented while respecting the First
Amendment rights of traders.4
While I do not purport to weigh the relative costs and benefits to
either the current libertarian approach, an alternative paternalistic
approach, or some other approach that splits the difference between these
two approaches, it is incumbent on Congress to review from time to time
its approach to the regulation of securities markets and exchanges,
particularly in the face of current events such as SMD trading. Likewise, I
do not purport to offer an alternative solution or rubric for regulating
securities markets to ensure that quoted prices of securities match the
underlying value of their issuers. Such proposed regulation is for minds
far more able than my own. However, if Congress intends to do its duty
in regulating interstate securities markets under its enumerated Commerce
Clause power, it must periodically ask itself, “[w]hat is the purpose of
federal securities law? What ends do we hope to achieve by securities
regulation? What form of securities regulation best serves the needs of
issuers, buyers, sellers, and the public?”
Until Congress is ready to answer this complex question, there can
be no intelligent approach to addressing SMD trading or other forms of
non-economic securities manipulation. Thank you for your time and the
chance to address this symposium.
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